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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, historically disadvantaged status
often serves as a dividing line with respect to health outcomes.
For instance, African Americans experience significantly higher
rates of type 2 diabetes, heart disease, stroke, HIV, obesity, and
many types of cancer than do their white counterparts.1
Similarly, rates of obesity, diabetes, and periodontal disease are
higher for Hispanics than for non-Hispanics.2 These diseases, of
course, can affect individuals of every background, yet
frequently, mortality rates for these diseases remain higher for
historically disadvantaged groups.3
Indeed, these health
disparities encountered by historically disadvantaged groups are
so well known that the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) have maintained a division dedicated to
improving minority health for more than two decades.4
These well-documented disparities have also formed the
basis of multiple scholarly arguments to expand legal protections
for individuals encumbered by health conditions. Currently, the
most extensive protections available to such individuals at the
federal level derive from the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),5 Rehabilitation Act,6 and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).7
Yet these laws do not
completely prohibit discrimination against individuals afflicted
by health conditions.8 Indeed, an individual may find herself not
1. See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health
Disparities
and
Inequalities
Report—United
States,
2013
(2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKS7-WAW5].
2. Diabetes Among Hispanics: All Are Not Equal, AM. DIABETES ASS’N
(July 24, 2014), http://www.diabetes.org/newsroom/press-releases/2014/diabetesamong-hispanics-all-are-not-equal.html [https://perma.cc/8SFT-TDJJ].
3. See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health Disparities and
Inequalities Report—United States, 2013 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKS7-WAW5].
4. See Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, About CDC’s
Office
of
Minority
Health
&
Health
Equity
(Nov.
14,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/healthequity/about/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DN4J-7SP5]
(“Although CDC has had an Office of Minority Health in place for over 20 years
(formerly the Office of Minority Health & Health Disparities or OMHD), in order to
comply with all provisions of the new statute, CDC organizationally re-aligned and
re-named its office: Office of Minority Health & Health Equity (OMHHE)”).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2012).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 793 et seq. (2012).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. (2012).
8. See, e.g., Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes in the Law Prohibiting Genetic
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covered by these Acts, despite suffering from a debilitating
health condition, because the condition does not fall within the
statutory definition of disability,9 the venue falls outside the
reach of the statute,10 or the condition cannot be accommodated
without imposing an undue hardship.11 To the extent that the
law continues to permit discrimination on the basis of health
conditions, historically disadvantaged groups bear the
disproportionate onus due to their disproportionately high rates
of affliction.
The resulting disparate impact of gaps in health-related
antidiscrimination protections on historically disadvantaged
populations has inspired a number of calls for reform. For
example, Jessica Roberts has previously argued against
employment policies that penalize health-related conduct
because of their likelihood to “disparately impact historically
disadvantaged groups, most notably racial and ethnic minorities,
people with disabilities, and the poor.”12 Similarly, Stephen D.
Sugarman has argued for the need for further legal protections
Discrimination, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
health/archive/2017/03/genetic-discrimination-law-gina/519216/
[https://perma.cc/
3EGZ-RZ4K].
9. Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a disability is defined as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1) (2012). Although
federal courts historically interpreted this definition in a narrow manner, the 2008
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) specifically instructed
courts to interpret the term “disability . . . in favor of broad coverage of
individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012);
see also Jennifer Bennett Shinall, What Happens When the Definition of Disability
Changes?
The
Case
of
Obesity,
5
IZA
J.
LAB.
ECON.
(2016),
http://izajole.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40172-016-0041-0 [https://perma.cc/
TN7F-8XQ7].
10. For example, prohibitions on disability and genetic discrimination are more
limited outside employment.
See, e.g., U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act Questions and Answers (Oct. 9, 2008),
https://www.ada.gov/qandaeng.htm [https://perma.cc/TE8P-7KC4] (noting that,
outside employment, the ADA’s guarantees of equal opportunity for disabled
individuals are limited to “public accommodations, . . . transportation, State and
local government services, and telecommunications”).
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(b)(5) (2012) (limiting employer’s
obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled employees in situations where the
accommodation would create an “undue hardship,” defined as “an action requiring
significant
difficulty or expense”).
12. Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination,
99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 616 (2014).

SHINALLFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

258

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

10/20/17 8:27 PM

[Vol. 18.2

against “lifestyle discrimination” in employment, in part by
pointing to the way in which certain lifestyle choices (and the
resulting negative consequences) are associated with race.13
Most expansively, Jessica Roberts and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard
have recently argued for sweeping antidiscrimination
protections—both inside and outside the workplace—against
healthism, which they define as “differentiat[ion] on the basis of
health in such a way that leads to systematic disadvantage and
is normatively wrong.”14 Like prior scholars, their argument
rests in part on concerns surrounding the questionable
voluntariness and mutability of health status, particularly for
ethnic and racial minorities.15 Indeed, even scholars who have
taken the opposite view, and ultimately support employer
imposition of health-related penalties, have recognized their
potentially regressive nature and, in the absence of careful
design choices, their likelihood of disparately impacting
historically disadvantaged populations.16
These prior scholarly arguments have been based on the
idea, grounded in empirical data, that historically disadvantaged
groups are more likely to experience health-based discrimination
because they are more likely to be afflicted by health
conditions.17 In other words, historically disadvantaged status is
correlated with poor health status, and poor health status is
often the target of discriminatory behavior in the form of
penalties against certain lifestyle choices and health conditions
that fall outside the ambit of current antidiscrimination

13. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment,
24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 410 (2003) (considering the correlation between
race and life choices, which can lower life expectancy, and the temptation to
disparately treat racial groups that may follow).
14. Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and Isn’t)
Healthism, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 906 (2015).
15. See id. at 853-61 (discussing how some, but not all, policies that penalize
poor health disparately impact historically disadvantaged populations).
16. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1517, 1569-70 (2009) (recognizing that “[c]ompany-imposed ‘taxes’ on unhealthy or
otherwise costly activities might be regressive” but ultimately arguing that
employers could avoid their regressive nature by “easily tailor[ing the taxes] to the
individuals’ wealth”).
17. David R. Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and racial
disparities in health: evidence and needed research, 22 J. OF BEHAV. MED. 20 (2009),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/davidrwilliams/files/2009-discrimination_and_racialwilliams.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W5E-QUVB].
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protections.18 For such cases, the legislative solution proposed
by Roberts and Leonard, which would prohibit healthist
policies—that is, policies that both systematically disadvantage
individuals with health conditions and produce a normative
wrong—could be advantageous for historically disadvantaged
populations.
For instance, imagine an employer wellness program that
financially penalizes workers with risk factors for heart disease,
such as high cholesterol and hypertension.19 Given the current
racial disparities in rates of heart disease and its risk factors,20
such a policy is likely to disproportionately burden African
American employees. Now suppose that, for the employer’s part,
the policy has purely good intentions—motivated by the idea
that improving employees’ health will both increase their
productivity and reduce health-related costs (e.g., health
insurance premiums and absenteeism) in the workplace—and
the perverse effects of the policy are wholly unintentional and
unexpected by the employer. Such a case may fall outside of the
protections found within Title VII’s prohibitions against
disparate impact discrimination on the basis of race, given that
the policy is arguably job-related (motivated by increasing
18. Often cited examples of such lifestyle choices and health conditions include
tobacco usage, obesity, and life expectancy more generally.
See, e.g.,
Roberts, supra note 12, at 616; Sugarman, supra note 13, at 410. Note, however,
that morbid obesity, clinically defined as a having a body mass index of 40 or higher
(as distinguished from obesity, clinically defined as having a body mass index
between 30 (inclusive) and 40), may be protected under the 2008 Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA). See Shinall, supra note 9.
19. Although the 2008 ADAAA broadened the definition of disability under the
ADA, thus expanding the scope of the Act’s coverage, discrimination on the basis of
risk factors for heart disease like high cholesterol and hypertension, without more,
arguably remains outside the scope of the ADA. A disability for ADA purposes must
“substantially limit[] one or more major life activities” or cause an employer to
“regard[ the employee] as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
(Given that high cholesterol and hypertension neither directly produce a substantial
limitation (only their comorbidities and complications may eventually do so), nor are
they readily apparent to an employer (although they may become increasingly
apparent through the proliferation of employer wellness programs), these conditions
will generally fall outside the scope of the ADA’s protections).
20. See, e.g., Garth N. Graham, et al. Impact of Heart Disease and Quality of
Care on Minority Populations in the United States, 98 J. NAT. MED. ASS’N 1579, 1579
(2006) (noting the “widespread health disparities for heart disease and related risk
factors among minorities in America”); George A. Mensah et al., State of Disparities
in Cardiovascular Health in the United States, 111 CIRCULATION 1233, 1233-41
(2005) (“Hypertension prevalence was high among blacks (39.8%) regardless of sex or
educational status”).
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employees’ productivity) and consistent with business necessity
(aimed at reducing costs imposed by employees’ poor health that
are borne by the employer).21
In this case, legislation
prohibiting healthism in employment could fill in the gaps left
by current antidiscrimination protections, which produce a
normatively uncomfortable result.
The above example illustrates the more general proposition
that, as long as historically disadvantaged status is merely
correlated with poor health status, antihealthism legislation
could provide a complete and satisfying solution to situations
that are normatively troubling, yet presently lack a legal
remedy. More generally, as long as discrimination on the basis
of health status and historically disadvantaged status are
additive in nature, novel legislation prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of health, combined with existing legislation
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national
origin, religion, sex, and age, would, in theory, sufficiently
remedy individuals who both have a health condition and are a
member of historically disadvantaged groups. The idea that
discrimination is additive in nature simply means that the total
amount of discrimination experienced by an individual who is a
member of multiple protected groups is equal to the sum of its
parts.22 If true, then a sixty-year-old African American male
with hypertension could be made completely whole by seeking
remedies under Title VII for any race-based discrimination he
experienced in the workplace, under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)23 for any age-based discrimination he
experienced in the workplace, and under antihealthism
legislation for any health-based discrimination he experienced in
the workplace.24
The antihealthism legislative solution proposed by Roberts
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
22. Bradley Areheart has previously characterized federal courts’ current view
of multiple discrimination claims as additive, as opposed to multiplicative. See
Bradley Allen Areheart, Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title
VII, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 199, 202 (2006).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2012).
24. Employment discrimination victims are entitled both to be made whole and
to be put in their rightful place under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (“It is also the purpose of
Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination”); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,
748 (1976) (endorsing a discrimination victim’s right to also “obtain his rightful
place”).
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and Leonard is less complete, however, if historically protected
status has a causal effect on health-based discrimination.
Instead of being additive in nature, in such a case, multiple
types of discrimination would be compounding or exacerbating in
nature, so the total amount of discrimination experienced by an
individual who is a member of multiple protected groups
becomes greater than the sum of its parts.25 This concept is
often referred to as intersectionality.26 Under the dominant
analytical framework of employment discrimination laws, in
which courts evaluate multiple claims of discrimination
separately, intersectional discrimination claims are intrinsically
unwieldy, and hence unlikely to produce a satisfactory remedy
for plaintiffs.27 If historically disadvantaged status actually
increases the level of health-based discrimination, as opposed to
coexisting with health-based discrimination, then our 60-yearold African-American male with hypertension would no longer
be made whole by seeking a remedy under a combination of Title
VII,28 ADEA,29 and antihealthism legislation.30 In the best-case
scenario, the separate remedies awarded under all three
statutes would nonetheless fail to compensate him for the

25. Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and
Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 794 (1981).
26. The theory of intersectionality traces its roots to legal scholars Elaine
Shoben and Kimberlé Crenshaw. See Shoben, supra note 25, at 798 (explaining her
theory of compound discrimination, in which “members of two or more protected
groups might be ‘disproportionately exclude[d]’ from employment”); Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989) (explaining the difficulty of
attempting to fit the “multidimensionality” of African-American women’s experience
into the single-dimensional framework” of antidiscrimination law recognized by
federal courts); accord Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief
(Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 713, 727 (2015) (discussing Shoben’s and
Crenshaw’s work); Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 991-92
(2011) (“[Crenshaw’s] work has inspired two decades of research on intersectionality
in many fields, including critical race theory, stratification, social psychology, and
women’s studies”).
27. Accord Areheart, supra note 22, at 202 (arguing that courts would not
recognize intersectional discrimination claims on their own, in the absence of
legislative action); Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2479, 2481 (1994) (“Many courts have been unwilling to accommodate
these [intersectional discrimination] understandings within Title VII doctrine”).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6 (2012).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012).
30. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 841.
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exacerbating effects that each form of discrimination had on the
others.
Even worse, the very nature of intersectional
discrimination may leave him without sufficient evidence to
prove one or more of his claims.31
When analyzing this
plaintiff’s race, age, and health discrimination claims separately,
a court may be unable to distinguish his employer’s motivations
from its suspicious actions (i.e., whether they were motivated by
race, age, or health), and as a result, determine that there is
insufficient evidence to support one or more of his discrimination
claims.32
The
proposition
that
health-based
discrimination
experienced by historically disadvantaged groups may be worse
than the health-based discrimination experienced by nonhistorically disadvantaged groups is more than a hypothetical
concern. Rather, prior scholarship suggests its reality. Based on
this prior scholarship, this Article will argue that more is
required than a simple legislative prohibition on healthism in
order to protect historically disadvantaged groups adequately.33
Instead, a complete solution to health-based discrimination
requires recognition, either by legislatures or courts, that other
types of legally prohibited discrimination may serve as
aggravating factors.34 In making this argument, this Article will
first review prior scholarship that points towards an
intersectional relationship between health and other types of
discrimination.
Although prior scholarship has heretofore
focused on the exacerbating effects of sex discrimination on
health discrimination, it nevertheless raises concerns that other
historically disadvantaged groups, such as racial and ethnic
minorities, may also fall victim to intersectional health-based
discrimination.35
The article will conclude by considering
possible solutions for intersectional healthism.

31. See Best, supra note 26, at 992 (finding that single-basis discrimination
plaintiffs were two times more likely to prevail than intersectional discrimination
plaintiffs).
32. See id. at 1018 (noting that “judges tend to believe that intersectional claims
can be neatly separated” and the harm that causes plaintiffs whose claims could not
be neatly separated).
33. See infra Section II.C.
34. See infra Section II.
35. See infra Section II.C.
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II. NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF HEALTH AND
PROTECTED STATUS
The Introduction posed a hypothetical situation of
intersectional healthism that could render a plaintiff without a
complete remedy, or worse, without any remedy, even under
Roberts’s and Leonard’s proposal for novel antihealthism
legislation.
This Part moves beyond the hypothetical to
document two widespread and systematic instances of
intersectional health-based discrimination that presently occur
in the workplace. As mentioned in the Introduction, the prior
work examining intersectional healthism has been limited to the
relationship between sex discrimination and specific types of
health-based discrimination in the labor market. Still, this
scholarship raises broader concerns about the potential for
racism, colorism, ethnicism, religionism, and ageism to
exacerbate health-based discrimination in the workplace and
beyond.
A. At the Intersection of Sex and Weight
Discrimination
Over the past three decades, an entire line of literature in
economics has explored the role of weight in the workplace.
These studies consistently find that a greater body mass index
(BMI)—a simple ratio between weight and height squared36—is
associated with lower employment rates and lower wages.37 In
fact, most of the recent literature has been devoted to

36. Throughout this article, weight categories are defined according to body
mass index (“BMI”), which is calculated using the following equation:
BMI = weight(lb) x 703 / (height(in)). Using BMI, individuals are then classified as
underweight if their BMI is less than 18.5, normal weight if their BMI is greater
than or equal to 18.5 but less than 25.0, overweight if their BMI is greater than or
equal to 25.0 but less than 30.0, obese if their BMI is greater than or equal to 30.0
but less than 40.0, and morbidly obese if their BMI is greater than or equal to 40.0.
Obesity: Symptoms, MAYO CLINIC ONLINE (2016), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/obesity/basics/symptoms/con-20014834 [https://perma.cc/2KU7-H7HL].
37. See, e.g., Steven L. Gortmaker et al., Social and Economic Consequences of
Overweight in Adolescence and Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008, 1011
(1993); Susan Averett & Sanders Korenman, The Economic Reality of the Beauty
Myth, 31 J. HUM. RESOURCES 304, 306-09 (1996); Jose A. Pagán & Alberto Dávila,
Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and Earnings, 8 SOC. SCI. Q. 756, 757-58 (1997);
John Cawley, The Impact of Obesity on Wages, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 451, 468
(2004).
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questioning the mechanisms behind the negative effects of BMI
on labor market outcomes, which has been documented across
multiple large observational datasets.38 Specifically, economists
have proposed three hypotheses for these negative effects. First,
an employee with a greater BMI may be rendered less
productive than an employee with a lower BMI because of the
physiological effects of weight on the body.39 This would, in
turn, make the employee with a lower BMI more ideal for
employers. Second, a greater BMI may raise employers’ costs,
such as raising the price of health insurance premiums (since
greater BMI is associated with a long list of comorbidities) or
introducing accommodation costs (for example, necessitating
that an employer buy a worker a larger chair).40 Third, the
negative relationship between BMI, wages, and employment
may result from taste-based animus;41 such animus could take a
variety of forms, including employers not liking heavier workers
or employers perceiving that either their customers or their
other employees prefer to deal with thinner workers.42
The negative relationship between BMI and labor market
outcomes may result from one or more of the above hypotheses,
but recent evidence suggests that at least some of the penalty
derives from the third hypothesis, taste-based animus.43
Although often referred to as “the obesity penalty,”44 the data
reveals that this negative relationship impacts the labor market
outcomes of overweight individuals (who have a BMI greater
than or equal to 25 but less than 30), obese individuals (who
have a BMI greater than or equal to 30 but less than 40), and
morbidly obese individuals (who have a BMI greater than or
38. See Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Distaste or Disability: Evaluating the Legal
Framework for Protecting Obese Workers, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 101 (2016).
These prior authors have documented a negative relationship between weight and
labor market outcomes in all the major publicly available datasets that include
observations on weight and wages, including the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), and the
Current Population Survey (CPS) combined with the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS).
39. See id. at 124.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 115.
42. For a more detailed discussion of these theories, see id. at 107-22.
43. See id. at 122-34 (arguing that the productivity and costs hypotheses are
undercut after examining the types of occupations in which overweight and obese
workers are employed).
44. Shinall, supra note 38, at 106.
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equal to 40), with the penalty increasing as BMI classification
increases.45 Juxtaposed with this well-documented penalty is
the fact that overweight and obesity rates are high and rapidly
increasing in the U.S. population. In 1994, only one in five
adults were obese or morbidly obese (22.9 percent of the
population) and one in three (33.1 percent of the population)
were overweight.46 By 2014, 37.7 percent of adults were obese or
morbidly obese, and an additional 32.8 percent of adults were
overweight.47 In only three decades, obesity rates increased by
almost two-thirds, so that today, nearly 70 percent of adults are
overweight, obese, or morbidly obese.48
Despite the fact that such a large portion of the population
endures the obesity penalty in the labor market, legal
protections at the federal level are limited.49 Early in the ADA’s
history, multiple plaintiffs filed lawsuits against their
employers, claiming that obesity was a disability for the
purposes of the Act.50 This litigation was successful in only one
instance: in 1993, the First Circuit upheld a $100,000 jury
verdict awarded to a morbidly obese job applicant in the refusalto-hire case entitled Cook v. Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, & Hospital.51 Other federal courts that heard
45. See, e.g., id. at 140-42; Shinall, supra note 9, at 12.
46. Estimates are derived from the National Health Examination Survey for
adults ages 20 and over from 1988 to 1994. See National Ctr. for Health
Statistics, Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity,
and Extreme Obesity Among Adults Aged 20 and Over: United States,
1960–1962 Through 2013–2014 (July 18, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/data/hestat/obesity_adult_13_14/obesity_adult_ 13_14.htm [https://perma.cc/U76HUJMG].
47. Estimates are derived from the National Health Examination Survey for
adults ages 20 and over from 2013 to 2014. See id.
48. National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases,
Overweight
&
Obesity
Statistics,
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/healthinformation/health-statistics/overweight-obesity [https://perma.cc/YN2V-D67T] (last
visited Aug. 4, 2017).
49. Note that ten state and local jurisdictions specifically prohibit
discrimination on the basis of weight and/or personal appearance. See Jennifer
Bennett Shinall, Less Is More: Procedural Efficacy in Vindicating Civil Rights, 68
ALA. L. REV. 49, 67-72, 99-118 (2016).
50. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. 10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1993). Note that Cook is a Rehabilitation Act
case since Cook’s employer was a public, not a private, employer, but ADA and
Rehabilitation Act case law is interchangeable for the purposes of determining the
existence of a disability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012) (“The standards used to
determine whether [the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging
employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under

SHINALLFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

266

BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW

10/20/17 8:27 PM

[Vol. 18.2

obesity cases prior to 2008 denied relief under the ADA, either
distinguishing or expressly rejecting the Cook, in finding that
the obese plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Act.52
With the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008, the obesity jurisprudence
under the ADA appeared to reverse course due to the more
inclusive definition of disability (and hence, the more expansive
coverage) under the Amendments Act.53 Between 2008 and
2016, multiple district courts concluded that at least morbid
obesity could qualify as a disability under the amended ADA,54
and the EEOC successfully litigated two disability cases arising
out of discriminatory practices against morbidly obese
employees.55 This uniform stance taken by the federal courts
with respect to morbid obesity in the years since the ADAAA has
been recently jeopardized by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Morriss v. BNSF Railway Company,56 which largely relied on
pre-ADAAA case law to decide that a morbidly obese plaintiff
was not disabled for the purposes of the ADA.57
Even if the Eighth Circuit decision turns out to be an
outlier, and other federal courts continue to recognize morbid
obesity as a disability under the ADA, the fact remains that
neither regular obesity nor overweight have ever been
title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990”).
52. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258,
1264 (11th Cir. 2007); E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436, 441, 443 (6th
Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v.
State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Shinall, supra note 9, at 5-6.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
54. See, e.g., Whittaker v. America’s Car-Mart, Inc. Case No. 1:13 CV 108 SNLJ
(E.D. Mo., April 24, 2014); Lowe v. American Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10 CV 24-A-D,
at 14 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 16, 2010); Melson v. Chetofield, No. 08-3683 Section:(R(3)), at
3-4 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2009); see also Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Unfulfilled Promises:
Discrimination and the Denial of Essential Health Benefits Under the Affordable
Care Act, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1235, 1267-69 (2017).
55. See E.E.O.C. v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695 (E.D.
La. 2011); Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Res. for
Human Dev. Settles EEOC Disability Suit for $125,000 (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-10-12a.cfm
[https://perma.cc/JF8QMUP2]; L.M. Sixel, Feds Sue Company for Firing 600 Pound Worker, HOUSTON
CHRON. (Sep. 27, 2011), http://www.chron.com/default/article/Feds-sue-company-forfiring-600-pound-worker-2191655.php [https://perma.cc/PA89-EMG3]; L.M. Sixel,
Fired Obese Worker Will Get $55,000, HOUSTON CHRON. (July 24, 2012),
http://www.chron.com/default/article/Fired-obese-worker-will-get-55-000-3732044.
php [https://perma.cc/Q85J-8GGL]; see also Shinall, supra note 38, at 111-12.
56. 817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016).
57. Id. at 1112-13.

SHINALLFINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

INTERSECTIONAL COMPLICATIONS

10/20/17 8:27 PM

267

recognized as a disability by federal courts. Yet, as described
above, the raw data makes clear that these conditions are
associated with wage and employment penalties (although
admittedly, the penalties for overweight and obese individuals
are less severe than for morbidly obese individuals).58 The
dearth of federal remedies available to the millions of
individuals whose labor market fortunes are diminished as a
result of their weight appears ripe for novel gap-filling
legislation, and the antihealthism legislation proposed by
Roberts and Leonard initially seems like a viable solution.59
Ideally, such legislation would provide a remedy for individuals
whose health condition has heretofore fallen outside the scope of
federal antidiscrimination protections—like overweight and
obese individuals—and if future federal courts follow the Eighth
Circuit, which would also serve as a remedy for morbidly obese
individuals.60
Although Roberts’s and Leonard’s proposal might be helpful
in ameliorating the weight-related penalties in the labor market,
a closer examination of the data on overweight and obese
workers questions whether it would serve as a complete remedy.
Table 1, which presents wage penalty estimates by sex and BMI
classification, reveals the intersectional nature of weight
discrimination.61 The top two columns present the raw wage
penalties for overweight, obese, and morbidly obese men and
women—that is, the penalties that do not adjust for the
underlying differences in education, demographics, and job
characteristics between these groups.62 The bottom two columns
present the adjusted wage penalties that do take these
underlying differences into account.

58. Jose A. Pagan & Alberto Davila, Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and
Earnings, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 756-67 (1997).
59. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 906-07 (2015).
60. Id. at 841-43.
61. The estimates presented in Table 1 are derived from estimates first
presented in Shinall, supra note 38, at 142. That article used matched data from the
2006 through 2008 Current Population Survey, American Time Use Survey, Eating
and Health Module, and Occupational Information Network.
62. Id.
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Table 1. Wage Penalties for Overweight, Obese, and Morbidly
Obese Individuals in the Workplace, by Sex
Raw Wage Penalties
Men
Women
Overweight
0.6%
Obese
-8.7%*
Morbidly Obese
-12.4%
Adjusted Wage Penalties
Men

-14.6%*
-22.3%*
-34.5%*

Overweight
Obese
Morbidly Obese

-4.0%*
-7.4%
-18.4%*

3.0%*
0.0%
-9.1%*

Women

Notes: Wage penalty estimates are derived from respondents ages 18 to 65 from the
combined 2006-2008 Current Population Survey, American Time Use Survey,
Eating and Health Module, and Occupational Information Network data.

Raw

estimates report the summary statistics by BMI classification. Adjusted estimates
are from OLS regressions that include controls for underweight, government
sector, union status, married, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, geographic
region (South, Midwest, and West), urban area, years of education, age, and age
squared. An * indicates a significant difference at the 10 percent level between the
normal-weight group and the BMI classification group of interest.63

Turning first to individuals classified as overweight, men
appear to receive an overweight premium, which actually
increases in the adjusted estimates. In contrast, overweight
women unambiguously encounter a wage penalty in the labor
market of at least 4.0 percent, when compared to their normalweight counterparts.
These wage penalties exponentially
increase as a woman moves up in BMI classification. As a
result, morbidly obese women endure an 18.4 percent wage
penalty compared to normal-weight women, even after adjusting
for underlying differences in education, demographics, and job
characteristics.
Compare these results to the results for
morbidly obese men, who encounter only a 9.1 percent wage
penalty (after adjustment) compared to normal weight men—
less than half of the penalty encountered by morbidly obese
women in the labor market. Moreover, in the adjusted wage
figures, the penalty completely disappears for obese men.
Meanwhile, obese women confront a 7.4 percent wage penalty,
even after adjusting for underlying differences.
63. For more details on these estimates, see Shinall, supra note 38, at 140-42.
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The numbers in Table 1 indicate that the realities of weight
discrimination are far more complex than an obesity penalty
that uniformly applies to all workers. The data make clear
weight gain alone does not automatically harm labor market
outcomes. Rather, weight gain plus sex harms labor market
outcomes.
Instead of being a straightforward example of
healthism, overweight and obesity are more complicated
examples of intersectional healthism. That is, in the context of
weight, it is not “differentiat[ion] on the basis of health . . . that
leads to systematic disadvantage and is normatively wrong[;]”64
it is differentiation on the combined basis of health and sex that
leads to systematic disadvantages and is normatively wrong.
At first, this distinction may seem like mere semantics. Yet
from an enforcement standpoint, the realities of weight
discrimination pose significant problems for antihealthism
legislation, such as the legislation proposed by Roberts and
Leonard, that does not take intersectional discrimination into
account. Even if such legislation made health a protected
class—in the same manner that race, color, national origin, sex,
religion, age, and disability are protected classes—female
workers penalized for their weight may nonetheless find
themselves without a remedy.
Because most employment
discrimination plaintiffs lack so-called “direct evidence of
discrimination” (smoking-gun statements by the employer are
the paramount example of direct evidence),65 the vast majority of
cases rely on the indirect method of proof, as formulated by
McDonnell Douglas v. Green66 and its lineage of successor
cases.67
Under this proof framework, courts’ traditionally

64. See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 906.
65. Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (1991) (“[T]he phrase
‘direct evidence’ is a misnomer. If direct evidence means anything, it refers to
evidence that, if believed, would establish a fact at issue. In disparate treatment
cases, the fact at issue is discriminatory intent. Even believing that . . . [a
supervisor] uttered [a smoking-gun statement] . . . would not establish that he (much
less the company) had such intent . . . . [He] may have said the words jokingly,
ironically, or mistakenly”).
66. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
67. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) (holding
that a plaintiff’s prima facie case establishes an inference of discrimination); Texas
Dept. of Commun. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (holding that the
defendant merely has the burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 530 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993) (holding that
plaintiff’s disproving the veracity of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory
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favored method to raise an inference of discrimination is by way
of the similarly situated comparator, an individual who is
similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects, except
protected class status, and has been treated better by the
employer.68
Although this method has been criticized by
scholars for multiple reasons,69 the example below will clarify
why it becomes particularly problematic in the context of
overweight and obesity.
Suppose an overweight female worker is demoted, and she
suspects that the demotion results from her employer’s
discriminatory animus towards her weight. Further suppose
that antihealthism legislation becomes a reality, and health is a
protected class. Even with this additional legal protection, in
the absence of explicitly derogatory statements by the employer
(such as, “fat people are all lazy”), the female worker would have
to rely on circumstantial evidence of her supervisor’s animus
towards her health condition. She could attempt to prove weight
discrimination by comparator, but this strategy could be
difficult. According to Table 1, being overweight is associated
with a wage premium for overweight men. If this female
worker’s employer was similar to most employers in the labor
market, then any animus towards being overweight would be
limited to women; even more problematic, being overweight
might be a positive attribute for men who work for the same
employer. Accordingly, any similarly situated overweight male
employees working at the same company would be at least as
well off (and perhaps even better off) than normal-weight male
employees. In other words, the employer would have a built-in
defense to claims of weight discrimination brought by female

reason is not necessarily sufficient to prove discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000) (clarifying that plaintiff’s
disproving the veracity of the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason may be
sufficient to prove discrimination).
68. Accord Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex
Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1491 (2009) (“The most common method is to
show that similarly situated employees of a different race or sex received more
favorable treatment”).
69. See, e.g., Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated
Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 849-62 (2002);
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 206-07 (2009); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L. J. 728, 748 (2011); Jennifer Bennett
Shinall, The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of
Disability Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1155 n. 169 (2017).
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employees relying on circumstantial evidence: “I do not
discriminate against overweight employees; here are examples of
all the overweight male workers who are highly successful in
this company.”
The employer’s built-in defense would disappear, of course,
if the female worker were allowed to bring an intersectional
healthism claim—that is, a claim that she was discriminated
against neither on the basis of weight alone, nor sex alone, but
the combination of weight and sex together. Thus, in the case of
weight discrimination, legal protections against simple
healthism70—without further legal protections against more
complex, intersectional healthism—will leave continue to leave
many victims without a remedy. Moreover, as the next section
will explain, the concerns raised here about intersectional
healthism extend beyond the isolated example of weight
discrimination.
B. At the Intersection of Sex and Disability
Discrimination
The exacerbating effect of sex discrimination is not
necessarily limited to weight-related animus. The concerns
raised in the previous sections regarding intersectional weight
discrimination may extend to health discrimination more
broadly. Specifically, prior empirical evidence suggests that sex
discrimination may also have a compounding effect on disability
discrimination.71 In fact, a review of all disability discrimination
charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) between 2000 and 2006 reveals just how
closely sex and disability discrimination are intertwined.72
Women file disability discrimination charges with the agency
more often than men,73 even though they are less likely to work
in risky jobs.74 In industries that are male-dominated, such as
70. By “simple healthism,” I mean discriminatory animus that is solely based on
health status. Simple healthism lacks any confounding discriminatory animus based
on other historically disadvantaged statuses, such as animus based on race, color,
national origin, religion, age, disability, or sex.
71. See Shinall, supra note 68, at 1102, 1113.
72. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1997 –
FY 2016 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/PA79-NEX7].
73. See id. at 1118-20.
74. See Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job Injury
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agriculture, mining, and construction, female workers file
disability charges at far greater rates than male workers.75
Male employees, conversely, file disability charges at greater
rates than female workers in the health care and education
industries,76 which are female-dominated.77 Moreover, disability
charges filed by a minority sex within an industry are far more
likely to be accompanied by a simultaneous Title VII sex
discrimination charge.78 This apparent relationship between sex
discrimination charges and disability discrimination charges
leads to greater overall disability charge filing rates for
women,79 as the majority of industries in the labor market are
male-dominated.80
Of course, greater charge-filing rates do not necessarily
indicate greater rates of discrimination.
Yet a more
comprehensive review of the EEOC disability discrimination
charge universe reveals that men’s charges are no more likely to
be meritorious than women’s charges, at least from the agency’s
perspective.81
That fact alone implies that women file
meritorious disability discrimination charges at greater rates
than do men.82 In addition, data from the Current Population
Survey—a large, observational data set administered by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics that contains information on labor
market outcomes and disability—indicate that while sex
differentials exist in the types of disabling conditions, overall
disability rates do not vary meaningfully by sex.83 That is to

Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 598, 598 (1998) (finding that women’s job-injury risk is
71% of men’s job-injury risk).
75. See Shinall, supra note 68, at 1132 (displaying ADA charge-filing rates per
worker graphically, by industry and sex). In the mining industry, for example,
women file ADA charges at rates that are more than double the rate at which men
file ADA charges.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1130-32.
78. This statement holds true for both men and women when they are the
minority sex within their industry. See id. at 1134 (displaying Title VII sex
discrimination charge-filing rates per worker graphically, by industry and sex,
within the universe of disability charge filers).
79. Id. at 1129.
80. Id. at 1131.
81. Shinall, supra note 68, at 1128-29 (showing that men’s claims are no more
likely to be rated as meritorious at intake, nor are they more likely to result in a
finding of reasonable cause).
82. Id. at 1127.
83. Id. at 1124.
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say, women are no more likely to be disabled than are men.84
The fact that rates of disability are not higher among women—
taken together with the fact that rates of meritorious disability
discrimination charge filings are higher among women—forms a
compelling argument that rates of disability discrimination are
indeed higher among women, particularly women in
male-dominated fields.85 Weight discrimination, it seems, is not
unique in its intersectionality with sex discrimination; rather,
sex discrimination’s exacerbation of discrimination based on
health conditions appears to be much broader in scope.
C. At the Intersection of Historically Disadvantaged
Status and Healthism
Taken together, the evidence regarding the intersectionality
of sex discrimination with both weight discrimination and
disability discrimination raises two larger concerns for future
antihealthism legislation, including the legislation proposed by
Roberts and Leonard. First, and most obviously, it raises
concerns that sex discrimination’s exacerbating effects extend
beyond weight discrimination and disability discrimination to
health-based discrimination more generally.86
If sex
discrimination’s intersectional effects extend to discrimination
based on all health conditions—even those health conditions
that do not qualify as a disability—then a simple legislative
prohibition on health discrimination that fails to account for
such intersectionalities will arguably be less effective for the
female half of the U.S. population.87 Indeed, a great deal of
empirical evidence already exists to suggest that disability
discrimination laws have been more effective for disabled men
than for disabled women.88 Without accounting for sex-health
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1121, 1125.
Accord id.
See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 895-96.
In 2015, Women comprised 50.8% of the total U.S. population. United
States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, 2016, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table
/PST045216/00 [https://perma.cc/C3PF-9AEN]. In the same year, women comprised
46.8% of the employed population in the United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2015 Current Population Survey Household Data: Annual Averages, Employed
Persons by Detailed Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity (2016),
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB29-3988] [hereinafter Labor
Statistics].
88. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of
Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL.
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intersectionalities, more general health discrimination laws will
suffer the same fate.
Second, and more broadly, the prior research on sex-weight
and sex-disability intersectionality raises concerns that other
types of discrimination besides sex that are already prohibited
by law—including racism, colorism, ethnicism, religionism, and
ageism—may also have intersectional, exacerbating effects on
healthism.89 To the extent that they do have such effects, a
simple legislative prohibition against healthism may prove to be
an ineffective remedy for individuals whose historical
disadvantage stems from more than just health. For individuals
whose disadvantaged status is solely based on health, then a
simple legislative prohibition on health discrimination would be
sufficient. But for individuals whose disadvantaged status is
based on health plus another protected characteristic, proving
such an intersectional health discrimination claim may turn out
to be very difficult, if not impossible, under a simple legislative
prohibition against healthism. For all the same reasons any
intersectional discrimination claim is difficult to pursue under
current antidiscrimination proof structures, as discussed at the
end of Part II.A, an intersectional health discrimination claim is
unlikely to fare much better.
If race, color, national origin, religion, and/or age
discrimination have intersectional effects with health
discrimination—in the same way that sex discrimination
arguably does—it further narrows the percent of the population
for whom simple antihealthism legislation would ultimately
prove beneficial. Currently, 38.4 percent of the total U.S.
population identifies as a racial and/or ethnic minority,90 and
ECON. 915, 949 (2001) (demonstrating empirically that young disabled women
worked between 2.37 and 4.57 fewer weeks in the years following the ADA, but
young disabled men worked between 0 and 3.11 fewer weeks); Kathleen Beegle &
Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Disability Discrimination Laws, 38 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 806, 853 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that disabled women’s
earnings declined by 4.9% after passage of a state disability law, but disabled men’s
earnings declined by only 1.5%).
89. See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14.
90. This figure comes from the 2015 Census estimate. United States Census
Bureau, QuickFacts (2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/RHI125215/00
[https://perma.cc/LR8Z-8HKA]. Racial and ethnic minorities are, on the whole,
underrepresented in the employed population within the United States. See, e.g.,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014-2015 Current Population Survey Household Data:
Annual Averages, Employed Persons by Occupation, Race, Hispanic or Latino
Ethnicity, and Sex (2016), https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat10.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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close to half of the population is over forty.91 Given the welldocumented correlations between racial and ethnic minority
status and poor health92—not to mention the well-documented
correlations between age and poor health93—intersectional
healthism could theoretically reach a great deal of individuals
afflicted with health conditions. Certainly, further research is
needed to determine whether intersectional healthism actually
extends beyond sex to other protected characteristics, but to the
extent that it does, any new legislation prohibiting health
discrimination must take such intersectionalities into account.
III. REMEDYING INTERSECTIONAL HEALTHISM
For Americans in the labor market with health conditions
that fall outside the scope of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and GINA, antihealthism legislation, like the kind proposed by
Roberts and Leonard,94 would unquestionably serve as a critical
first step in increasing their legal protections in the workplace.
Moreover, to the extent that such legislation would also operate
outside the workplace, it could expand legal protections even for
individuals who presently enjoy coverage by disability and
genetic discrimination laws solely inside the workplace. Yet, as
this article has argued, simple healthism—discriminatory
animus based solely on health—may be surprisingly rare.
Existing empirical evidence already suggests the frequency and
severity with which sexism exacerbates healthism in the workplace (and presumably, outside the workplace as well).
Considering courts’ historic inability to recognize intersectional
claims in the absence of express statutory recognition and
CR3U-M9S3] (finding that 20.8% of the U.S. employed population identifies as
nonwhite).
91. According to 2010 Census estimates, 39.4% of the total U.S. population is 45
or older. U.S. Census Bureau, Age and Sex Composition: 2010 (May 2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5YS5PZYM]. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates from last year suggest that older
individuals are slightly overrepresented in U.S. workplaces, comprising 44.4% of the
U.S. employed population. See Labor Statistics, supra note 87.
92. See, e.g., Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health Disparities and
Inequalities Report—United States, 2013 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EJ-QBTJ].
93. See, e.g., Anne Case & Angus S. Deaton, Broken Down by Work and Sex:
How Our Health Declines, in DAVID A. WISE, ED., ANALYSES OF THE ECONOMICS OF
AGING 185-86 (2005).
94. See Roberts & Leonard, supra note 14, at 895-96, 906.
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appreciate the exacerbating effects of multiple types of
discrimination, the existing evidence both highlights the
importance of explicitly incorporating protections for sex-health
intersectionality
into
antihealthism
legislation,
and
contemplates proactive protections against other types of
intersectional healthism that may already exist, but are less
well understood.
Still, given the current political climate, the argument
presented here regarding new antihealthism legislation may
seem to be a mere thought experiment in a pure hypothetical.
The new Republican presidential administration—along with
the newly installed One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress with
Republican majorities in both houses—have repeatedly signaled
their hostilities towards existing civil rights protections, let
alone new civil rights protections.95 Yet new antihealthism
legislation may not be completely out of the question in the
coming years. Whether or not Democrats like to admit it, all
existing
federal
protections
against
health-related
discrimination in the workplace have passed during Republican
presidential administrations: the Rehabilitation Act passed in
1973 under President Richard Nixon’s administration, the ADA
passed in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush’s
administration, and both the ADAAA and GINA passed in 2008
under President George W. Bush’s administration.96 Indeed,
95. See, e.g., Janell Ross, What the Trump Administration Wants You to Know
about
Civil
Rights
and
Policing,
WASH. POST,
(Jan.
23,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/what-does-the-trump-administration-have
-to-say-about-civil-rights-and-policing/2017/01/23/edf29d4c-e17a-11e6-879b-35666338
3f1b_story.html?utm_term=.1ed3e0b4260c [https://perma.cc/6QCT-N88U] (arguing
that “[s]ince Trump’s election victory, his decision to nominate Sen. Jeff Sessions (RAla.)
as
the
nation’s
next
attorney
general
has
intensified
this
perception” that the new administration “would not be particularly attentive to civil
rights”); Justin Miller, Trump’s WhiteHouse.Gov Disappears Civil Rights, Climate
Change,
LGBT
Rights,
DAILY
BEAST
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2017/01/20/trump-s-whitehouse-govdisappears-civil-rights-climate-change-lgbt-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/QZN3S2GE] (describing the immediate disappearance of civil rights webpages from the
White House website upon President Trump’s inauguration).
96. One arguable exception to this statement is the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed under President Barack Obama’s administration
(and perhaps soon to be repealed), which—among other things—mandated that
health insurance plans end discrimination based on preexisting conditions. See
U.S.C. § 1181 et seq. (2012). Since this mandate affected both non-employer-provided
and employer-provided insurance, the ACA indirectly reduced health-related
discrimination in the workplace.
For a critique of the ACA’s approach to
antidiscriminatory reform in health care, see Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism: A
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President George H. W. Bush recently recalled the ADA as one
of his “proudest achievements.”97
If this suggestion proves overly optimistic, however, and
antihealthism legislation like the kind proposed by Roberts and
Leonard remains unrealized in the coming years, they have
nonetheless presented a compelling argument for courts to
intervene and interpret existing health-related protections more
broadly. This is especially true with regards to the ADA, which
holds the potential to have the broadest reach.98 Along these
lines, the evidence reviewed in this article at the very least
presents additional grounds for courts to resist their historical
urges to parse a multifaceted claim brought under existing
antidiscrimination statutes into multiple, individual claims.
Instead, courts must recognize that discriminatory animus can
compound—particularly when health is involved—and open the
door to consideration of these multifaceted, intersectional claims
under existing antidiscrimination laws.99

Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care
Reform, U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2012).
97. David Crary, 25 Years On, Disabilities Act Has Changed Lives of Millions,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 25, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut25-years-on-disabilities-act-has-changed-lives-of-2015jul25-story.html
[https://perma.cc/4HLM-K84Y].
98. The definition of disability under the ADA, which protects employees who
work for an employer with fifteen or more employees in the private sector, could be
interpreted quite expansively. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1) (2012). Moreover, in the
2008 Amendments, Congress admonished courts to read the definition “to the maximum extent permitted.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
99. Indeed, existing antidiscrimination statutes do not prohibit courts from
considering intersectional claims together, and the Title VII’s “plus” line of cases
provide an explicit framework for considering sex-plus-health or race-plus-health
discrimination claims. For a discussion of how courts can better use the plus
framework to consider health-based intersectional discrimination claims. See
Shinall, supra note 68, at1149-50.
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